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RICHARD BowNAS 
THE NEPALESE MAOIST MovEMENT IN CoMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE: LEARNING FROM THE H ISTORY OF 
NAXALISM IN INDIA 
This paper compares the contempo rary Maoist movement in Nepal with the Naxa lite movemelll 
in Indi a, from 1967 to the pre se nt. Th e pape r touc hes on three main areas: the two movemems' 
ambiguous relation ship to ethnicity, the hi stories o f prior 'traditiona l' m obili zation that bo th move-
ments drew on, and the relationship between vanguard and ma ss movement in both cases . The firs t 
a im o f the pape r is to show how the Naxa lite move me m has trans formed itself ove r the last 35 years 
and how its militar y tacti cs and orga nizationa l· form have c hanged . I th en as k whether Nepal's lvla o-
is ts more close ly resemble th e ea rli er phase of Naxa li s m , in which the leadership had broad popular 
app eal and worked close ly with it s peasa nt base, o r its late r phase, in whi ch the leadership became 
dise ngaged from its base and adopted urban 'terror ' tactics. The paper ends with so me s pec ulations 
as to whe re the lV!aoi st movement in Nepa l is headin g, base d on the comparisons made earlie r. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper places the lvlaoist movement of Nepal 
in historical context with the Naxalite movement 
in India. I am certainly not claiming that the future 
of the Maoists can be read in the evolution of the 
Naxalites. Rather, the paper highlights aspects of the 
thirty-year history of Naxalite revolt in India that 
parallel the current Maoist insurgency in Nepal. My 
hope is that an analysis of India's Naxa lite movement 
will provide scholars with insights that can guide fu-
ture research on the 1v!aoist movement in Nepal. 
Social movements are rarely if ever unified, ho-
mogeneous phenomena. 1 The Naxalite movement in 
India is no exception and this is perhaps the most 
valuable lesson the comparison can teach us: while 
the Maoist movement in Nepal may superficially 
appear ideologically united and highly organized 
around common goals , it arose from particular his-
torical events that affected specific peoples at certain 
identifiable places 2 Examining the Naxalite move-
ment from the longer perspective its history provides 
may allow us to identify these local and historically' 
grounded roots of rural insurgency and use the in-
sights this perspective provides to analyze the case 
of Nepal. 
In this paper I will not address another important 
issue: the direct connections between Naxalism and 
Nepal 's 't•/laobaadi, in terms of resource sharing, mil-
itary training and ideological borrowing. This could 
be the topic for a different strand of research . 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT 
To understand the events and processes that have 
come to be termed 'Naxalism' l w11l first present a 
'top clown' account of the educated leadership of 
the movement and their ideological splits, and then 
make a 'bottom up' analysis of the experiences and 
beliefs of the peasant supporters 3 
The 'top down' hi story of the movement would 
begin with the series of splits that affected the In-
dian communist movement in the 1950s and 60s: a 
fragmentation of the Left that parallels Nepal's. The 
main ideologica l argument was between those com-
munists who imitated the success of the Congress 
Party by se tting up patron client networks to ensure 
electoral success at the regional level , and those com-
munists who chose the lvlaoist-inspirecl approach of 
revolution in the countryside, followed by the en-
c irclement and capture of the cities. 
. The "revisionist" electoral path to power advocated 
by the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India had in-
duced its more radical members to form the Mao-
ist-oriented Communist Party (Marxist), or CPI ('tvl) 
in the 1950s. By the late 1960s, when the Naxalbari 
unrest began , this more revolutionary party fa ced 
new internal divisions. The CPI (M) had entered into 
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a new coalition government in Bengal with the CPI and was 
keen to preserve its nevv institutional status. The more revo-
lutionary elements of the CPI (M) broke off in 1969 to form 
the CPI (Marxist Leninist), the party most closely associated 
with the Naxalite revolt. This newest party was dominated 
by the forceful, some would say Stalinist , personality of CPI 
(ML) leader and propagandist,4 Charu Mazumdar. Mazum-
dar's domination of the CPI (ML) conveys the impression that 
the Naxalite movements which allied themselves with the 
CPI (ML) were under the CPI (ML)'s control, but at no time 
did one party, leader, or organization have overall control of 
events 5 
The Naxalite movement began in 1967 at Naxalbari, near 
Siliguri in West Bengal. After 
the police had beaten and 
raped women of the tribal 
"Santal" group, Santal peas-
ants and tea plantation labor-
ers revolted and were joined 
by some non tribal lower and 
middle peasants. The actions 
undertaken included the ex-
ecution of landlords, redis-
tribution of grain, and the 
destruction of land deeds. Al-
though this was a short-lived, 
locally based movement, it 
was immediately claimed 
by the CPI (ML) as part of 
its revolutionary project and 
was publicized by China's Peoples' Daily, which declared in a 
headline that "Spring Thunder is breaking over India." But an 
Indian revolution did not follow. Instead, the Naxalbari revolt 
was crushed after just four months by police. 
Nevertheless, the Naxalite revolt provided a model that 
was imitated in a sporadic fashion across India's "tribal belt," 
her northern and eastern states. The greatest success came 
in Srikakulam, Anclhra Pradesh, where the 'Girijans,' another 
tribal people, were able to form a longer lasting movement. 
I will discuss the reasons why particular regions were more 
successful than others in organizing later in this paper. 
By 1969, with most of the attempted rural uprisings weak-
ening and cadres not able to inspire mass support, Naxalite 
tactics changed. Those movements, under the influence of 
Charu Mazumclar, started a program of 'class anni~ilation' 
and covert assassination coordinated by an influx of CPI (ML) 
students from Calcutta . 
This emphasis on terror reached itspeak in 1970-71 vvhen 
the assassination program moved into Calcutta itself6 'vVhen 
the police cracked clown in Calcutta, they killed as many as 
5,000 supporters, most in extra judicial fashion. By 1972 
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Naxalism appeared to be a thing of history and its leader, 
Mazumclar, was dead. 
However, the movement had an afterlife. After surviving a 
few years underground , the end of the 'emergency' period in 
the late 1970s allowed Naxalite-inspirecl movements to re-
emerge in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. This has been the pat-
tern since: as repression increases the movements disappear 
only to emerge when conditions relax, as for example during 
the early 1990s when the Congress went though a period of 
internal fractiousness allowing the "Maoist Communist Cen-
ter" to rise up in Andhra and the "Peoples' War Group" to 
attack landlords in Bihar. 
The focus of the more recent movements has been less 
ambitious, because revolu-
tionaries realize that they 
cannot realistically seize 
control of the state. How-
ever, Naxalite groups do 
exercise effective power 
over millions of Indians in 
the Telengana and Danda-
karanya regions of Andhra 
and in large parts of anar-
chic southern Bihar. They 
have had strong enough 
support from 'clalit' ('un-
touchable') populations 
and from tribal peoples to 
establish local 'administra-
tions' that perform many 
governmental functions that the state has failed to do in rural 
India. 
"OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" AS CAUSE OF REVOLT? 
Can the Naxalite revolt be explained by "objective" class 
conditions in the Indian countryside? The Naxalites, in lan-
guage prefiguring Nepal 's Maoists, claimed they were fighting 
a vvar against 'semi-feudal, semi-capitalist forces,' and that the 
objective nature of exploitation in the countryside, with its 
combination of pre-capitalist bondage and capitalist market 
relations, was impoverishing and abusing the poor majority 
and inducing them to revolt. 
Clearly, objective economic conditions contribute towards 
revolt. Routledge (1997) identifies five main variables in his 
analysis of the Naxalite movement: 
l. Land inequality in which the bottom 50% of households 
controlled just 9% of available agricultural land by the early 
1970's. 
2. Underemployment of landless laborers leading them to 
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Lake loans at exorbitant rates of interest. 
3. Harvest failures in 1965-67, just before the Naxalbari 
revolt began, which were exacerbated by a cut in US food aid 
in 1966. 
4. The unequal regional impacts of the Green Revolution, 
whose benefits were concentrated in the wheat-producing 
areas . 
5. Urban recession, which hit West Bengal especially hard 
and thereby made unemployed student activists available to 
the CPI (ML). 
However, this list of variables fails to provide a complete 
explanation. Most social scientists long ago abandoned as 
over-simple explanations for contentious politics that posit 
changes in economic situation as adequate incentive for re-
volts. Such conditions applied over large swathes of Northern 
and Eastern India, but Naxalite revolts only emerged in a few 
places. 
In an article in India's Economic and Political Weekly in 
December 1982 Alice Thorner critically examined a large 
number of Marxist analyses of the "objective conditions" of 
the rural poor in India, many of which had sought to explain 
Naxalite violence. Thorner found that issues of caste and 
consciousness had been largely overlooked, as these scholars 
mechanistically attempted to place Indian peasants into class 
groupings and to explain their political behaviors as the re-
sult of their class position. 
Thorner concluded that we must go beyond economic re-
ductionism and examine the connections between ethnicity, 
social structure, and economics in order to understand phe-
nomena such as the Naxalite movement. 
THE ETHNIC ROOTS OF NAXALISM 
Naxalite rebellions were most enduring in the hill areas of 
West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, where tribal peoples are 
concentrated. The history of the Santals in West Bengal and 
of the Girijans in Andhra is a crucial part of the history of 
Naxalism that might cast some light on the 'ethnic' character 
of Maoism in Nepal. 
Calman (1985) describes hovv the Girijans in Andhra 
suffered in the 1960's from increasing state incursions into 
communal forests. Traditional users of forest resources found 
themselves restricted in their access by state appointed for-
est guards. Accompanying this threat to communal re.sources 
was the more general monetization of social relations in 'the 
countryside, whichh had disproportionately negative conse-
quences for tribal peoples, who found themselves increasingly 
in debt to money lenders in order to preserve their standard 
of living. The Girijans did not have access to the patronage 
networks and party officials of the Congress or CPL They had 
no state officials who would intercede on their behalf when it 
came to legal battles over land tenure or usurious debts. It was 
in this context of imperiled communal life that Maoist cadres 
were able to mobilize tribal people to resist threats to their 
communities in ways described in the following section. 
In West Bengal analyses from Mukherjee (1987) and 
Duyker (1987) shows a different pattern of exclusion of tribal 
peoples, but with similar consequences. Here, Santal peoples 
(previously semi-sedentary slash-and-burn agriculturalists) 
had been imported into the area by the British in order to 
work on the tea plantations. Like the Giryans, the Santals re-
mained outside of the reciprocity networks of the Hindu com-
munity. This, according to Mukherjee, gave them a peculiar 
sense of class exploitation, as compared to those Hindu peas-
ants who were included in a system of noblesse oblige. They 
were therefore more liable to be mobilized along class lines by 
Maoist cadres, who, in Duyker's analysis, adeptly used ethnic 
symbolism to unite them. 
In the case of both Girijans and Santals, ethnic outsider 
status made these groups fertile ground for mobilization, but 
it is important to bear in mind the differences: the Girijans 
were resisting state incursion onto communal land, whereas 
the Santals were already partly proletarianized wage laborers 
who were mobilized around communal tribal motifs. 
Parallels to Nepal's Maoist affected areas are not straightfor-
ward. In Nepal, too, ethnic outsiders have become increasing-
ly impoverished and lack access to state-sponsored sources of 
jobs and money; in Nepal, too, Maoists have used collective 
ethnic identities to mobilize villagers. However, patterns of 
exploitation differ, with ethnic groups in Nepal having longer 
histories of tributary relations with the state. Research may 
help to show whether Nepal's Maoism has been organized 
around the struggle for ethnic autonomy over resources what 
Routledge (1997) terms the 'ethno ecological' aspects of 
insurgency to the same degree as Indian Maoism. 
NAXALISM AND PRE-EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURES OF 
RESISTANCE 
So far I have briefly discussed the e-::onomic crises and con-
ditions that preceded Naxalism and the reason that ethnic 
minorities were most likely to participate in revolt. However, 
I have not said much about the actual organization of the 
Naxalite movements, specifically, the structure of the move-
ment and the symbolic tools its leaders used to inspire peas-
ants to undertake the enormous physical risk of revolt . We 
need to know how the costs of action were reduced. Naxalite 
movements lasted longest and had the most social impact in 
those areas where there was a pre-existing infrastructure of 
resistance and where memories of historical battles against 
the state could be drawn upon by leaders to make symbolic 
THE NEPALESE MAOIST MOVEMENT IN (o~PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE/ Bownas 33 
appeals. 
ln Naxalbari, local-level communist cadres had been work-
ing with Santa! tribes since 1951, a full sixteen years before 
the actual revolt7 These cadres had integrated themselves 
into local communities, even marrying Santa! women. The 
strategy at this point had been one of community building 
and raising consciousness rather than revolutionary action . 
. ln Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh, Caiman (1985) describes a 
similar story, where Communal units called 'sanghams' were 
built up at the village-level by communist cadres living in the 
community. These units acted to protect local communities 
from state attempts to commandeer communal resources , to 
intercede on their behalf with the courts, and to protect com-
munities from landlord I police incursions. As in Naxalbari 
these communist leaders were working on a mainly local ba-
sis, and the issues that they pursued were chosen mainly by 
the communities they worked with. 
These leadership or 'vanguard ' groups (to use the favored 
revolutionary term) were embedded in the communities with 
whom they worked. Although these leaders were clearly try-
ing to create a form of class consciousness in the countryside, 
they realized that issues of class were inextricably bound up 
with ethnicity and with the demand for cultural and ecologi-
cal preservation . 
Ranajit Guha (1983) in his classic work on peasant insur-
gencies in nineteenth century India describes hovv 'territori-
ality,' that is, the commitment to a local place, and 'solidarity,' 
or kinship ties, were the binding factors behind insurgencies 
against the British colonialists. Actions like looting, the burn-
ing of documents , and the redistribution of grain which were 
typical of the initial stage of the Naxalite revolt and of their 
earlier antecedents. These were not lV!aoist innovations, but, 
like Maoism itself, were partly rooted in ancient forms of 
peasant resistance. 
For Guha, these traditional forms of insurgency stand on 
the boundary between a 'conservative' attempt to maintain 
community (which might be led by tribal elites) and a more 
radical sense of class consciousness, through which peasants 
begin to see connections between their plight and that of oth-
ers similarly placed in the productive process. 
Indeed, there is a direct link between some of the rebellions 
Guha analyzes and the Naxalbari revolts. A tribal group, the 
"Hul ," had revolted against the Briti sh in the 1850s. The San-
tals had preserved stor ies of the Hul revolt in their oral tradi-
tions , so they were able to draw on knowledge of these revolts 
to motivate their cadres (Duyker, 1987). Duyker shows how 
Naxalite leaders drew on such oral histories and incorporate 
them into their tactics . For example, the cadres who led the 
1967 uprising deliberately encouraged the use of traditional 
bows and arrows , despite their impracticality, in order to keep 
warriors conscious of their ethnic group's long term connec-
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tions to the land. 
Historical legacies also help account for the success of the 
movement in Telengana, Anclhra Pradesh, where not only the 
memory, but the very leaders of the Telengana revolt of the 
1940s vvere still alive and active in the new movement. ln 
sum, the Maoist action in rural India before the late 1960s 
involved a careful balance between progressive politics and 
traditional demands for conservation of community and re-
sources. 
THE DEMISE AND REVIVAL OF NAXALISM: 1975-2000 
Until about 1969 the relationship between the peasants 
and the CPI (ML) vanguard was one of cooperation and sym-
biosis. In 1969, under the direction of CPI (ML) leader Charu 
Mazumclar and an elite of West Bengali intellectuals the di-
rection of the movement changed. Mazumdar tried to revolu-
tionize the peasantry using the strategy of class annihilation: 
Once an area is liberated from the clutches of class enemies 
the state is deprived of its eyes and ears in the village .. . the 
political units [i.e., the vanguard] raises the slogan "seize the 
crops of the class enemy" and even the most backward peas-
ants join the battle. The state does not sit idly by however. 
The police raid the villages and small guerilla squads now an-
nihilate class enemies as well as the reactionary police force . 
The annihilation campaign will bring into the hands of the 
guerilla force the modern weapons of the reactionary state 
machinery. 8 
This tactic temporarily seemed to succeed in Srikakulam 
(Ram 1971, pll7), but the success was primarily due to tradi-
tional mass mobilization I resistance techniques employed by 
Nagi Reddy, the senior Maoist leader9 in Andhra who opposed 
Mazumdar's 'annihilation line.' In fact, the 'annihilation line' 
brought clown the full force of state repression on the peas-
antry, a disaster which undermined the links between van-
guard and mass movement. 
From 1969, Mazumdar relied on urban students from petit 
bourgeois backgrounds to lead secret assassination squads in 
the countryside. The open, mass assaults peasants had made 
to defend their home territories gave way to a secret campaign 
of assassination carried out mainly by outsiders. Guha (1983) 
notes these tactics have little or no value in raising conscious-
ness and are poor organizing tools . Despite the stated aim of 
making peasants aware of the repressive power of the state, 
this tactic was regressive. The movement had abandoned its 
roots in the local in favor of increasingly nihilistic and secre-
tive violence against individuals. The movement had lost its 
way. 
The history of Naxalism did not, however, end in 1971. 
Rather, the movements survived by returning to the local as 
the source of their power. The Naxalite-inspired movements 
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thal survive in Bihar and A ndhra Pradesh are based mainly on 
' iclenlily politics,' 10 in other words on claims not directly con-
nec ted to economic struggle. In the 1980s and1990s issues of 
aste, ethnici ty, gender, and environmental preservation have 
been used more frequently in their propaganda. Naxalism in 
Bihar has been instrumental in promoting caste-based mili-
tias to protect lower caste groups from upper caste violence. 
Th~ 'protection' of forest resources has also been a vital tool 
in attracting the support of tribal communities. 
The economic side of this localism is that the Naxalites 
are firmly rooted in the loca l economy as quasi-enterprises 
or mini-states. They demand protection money/taxation from 
villagers and in return provide protection from landlord/po-
lice violence, bas ic community se rvices such as clean water 
and elementary education , and 
development loans like a micro 
finance NGO. This new fo cus 
on the local and the marginal-
ized has won Naxa lism support 
among India's human rights 
community. Naxa lites are seen 
almost as fellow travelers with 
anti-dam campaigners and en-
vironmentalists. 
There is another side to this 
localism , however. V/ith the 
abandonment of attempts to 
'scale up' the movement or to 
appeal to broader constituen-
cies, the Naxalite groups have become enmeshed in profitable 
local activities such as the sale of tendu leaf and bamboo from 
the forests, or trade in the mineral bauxite. Profits from these 
activities now exceed earnings from more traditional fund-
raising acti vities such as looting from banks and rich land-
lords. According to some sources, profits are being reinvested 
in the drugs trade and other, more legitimate businesses. In 
Bihar this 'economism' has brought the two leading Naxalite 
operations , the 1vlao ist Command Center and the Peoples' 
War Group (P\-\IG), into conn ict over territory. Some reports 
in the Indian press also point to collusion between Naxalite 
groups and local politicians. For example , Naxalite leaders 
may have made deals with local BJP parties to en sure that 
elections are boyco tted. Guerrillas h ave also been hired out 
as mercenaries. 
As contemporary Naxalism has entrenched itself in the 
local economies, state officials may have little incentive to 
launch a full scale offensive against their strongholds because 
. the sta te may not be able to provide the basic services that the 
Naxalites offer. The Naxa lites themselves have little incen-
tive to expand their aims or try to form progt:essive coalitions 
with other groups, because they are economicaliy self-suffi-
cient in the areas they control. Local people in Naxalite-af-
fected regions may sometimes complain that "Naxal Raj is no 
better than police Raj,'' but in the absence of state protection 
they have little choice but to pay the 'taxes' required and re-
ceive the limited services and advocacy that the Naxalites can 
provide. 
APPLYING INSIGHTS FROM THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT 
TO NEPAL 
The history of the Naxalite movement shows that the van-
guard and mass movement can be in very different relations 
with each other at different times and places, despite the su-
perficial appearance of ideological uniformity. The question is 
important for the way we view insurgencies and for the policy 
approaches we take to deal with 
them. At the risk of simplifica-
tion, there are three possible 
types of vanguard/mass move-
ment relation: 
l. The vanguard is aloof from 
the masses it claims to repre-
sent. Tactics tend to involve 
secret killings directed by elite 
groups from geographically 
distant locations. Political dis-
course tends to be abstract and 
removed from local culture. 
Mass action and consciousness 
raising and education take sec-
ond place to territorial expansion. Naxalism in the late 1960s 
under Mazumdar's leadership approximates this type. 
2. The vanguard is responsive to the mass movement and 
its leaders, and, if not actually from the local community, the 
vanguard members have strong personal ties to local com-
munities. Action is primarily directed to raising conscious-
ness and building the strength of the community, though 
with longer term strategic ends in mind. Violence tends to be 
characterized by 'resistance' to external threats rather than 
territorial expansion. Local history and culture inform the 
political discourse. Pre-Naxalite communist activities in Ben-
gal and Andhra Pradesh approximate this type, or that part of 
the movement (in Andhra) led by Nagi Reddy. 
3. The vanguard enters into a symbiotic relationship with 
the local. The movement becomes fragmented into regional or 
even village-level movements. No attempt is made to expand 
the area of action; consciousness raising is not attempted. 
Political discourse takes on an ethnic coloring, possibly in 
an exclusivist manner. Violence may be directed against rival 
factions over territorial control, but is sporadic and mainly 
justified as "resistance". The main aim of the movement is 
survival, with larger political ambitions abandoned. The con-
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temporary Naxalite movement may approx imate this type. 
Why do movements end up in one type or change from one 
type to another7 Ideological commitment and the strategy of 
particular leaders are obviously a vital part of the explana-
tion, but strategy and ideology are also shaped by the politi-
cal and economic resources available to the vanguard of the 
movement. The process may be determined by the extent to 
which the vanguard need the mass movement to obtain their 
ends, and the ways they need it. 
In the early 1960s communist cadres worked closely with 
local communities and in-
corporated local history 
and culture into their politi-
cal symbolism and tactics. 
Why did this change in 
the late 1960s? One reason 
could be the perception 
that the movement would 
receive the backing of an 
external power, China 
(based on its praise for the 
movement in the 'Chinese 
Peoples Daily' in 1967 and 
though informal contacts) 
The assumption that this 
political resource would 
become available may have 
made Charu Mazumdar and 
his allies more confident as they pursued their elite-led as-
sassination campaign, which actually was eroding the social 
basis of radical politics in the countryside. 
In the 1970s it became clear that China would not inter-
vene on behalf of revolutionary movements in India. The 
Naxa lite movement now had to return to working with lo-
cal communities. However, the way they did this was shaped 
by the availability of economic resources, in particular those 
from the forests. As the ex traction of bamboo and other forest 
products became their chief source of income, Naxalite lead-
ers had to cooperate closely with local communities to mange 
forest product extraction sustainably. The profits from this 
forest-based trade are substantial but not enough to allow the 
Naxalite leaders to lose their reliance on local cooperation. 
Thus, the vanguard has become bound to the local through 
its source of funds. 
Here, a comparison with Peru's 'Shining Path' Maoist" move-
ment is informative: Senclero Luminoso, the 'Shining Path,' 
funded itself through the coca trade and its choice of strategy 
was guided by the need to control coca growing areas. Coca 
fetches a high price, Sendero Luminoso leaders accumulated 
large profits, and the vanguard of the movement. did not need 
to develop strong bonds w ith the local community in order 
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to maintain its income stream. The extreme violence of the 
'Shining Path' must be strongly connected to the high eco-
noniic rewards coca produces and to the need to defend those 
rewards by keeping the state and rival groups out of coca pro-
clueing territory. 
So what about Nepal: what vanguard/mass movement rela-
tions characterize the Maobaadi? 'vVithout recent direct ex-
perience in Maobaadi controlled territory this question can 
be addressed better by other authors of this volume. But I 
can add ress the factors that are most likely to shape those 
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relations. 
The areas in which the 
Maobaadi are strongest are 
generally resource poor 
compared with Northern 
India , let alone Peru . Does 
this mean the vanguard 
has to work closely with lo-
cal communities or does it 
have the opposite effect of 
creating a pure extraction 
economy, in which villagers 
are expected to hand over 
food? In India contempo-
rary Naxalites have tried to 
improve local production 
and have distributed loans 
for development purposes. 
In Nepal, in the absence of sustainable sources of income due 
to low productivity of the land and the limited number of 
banks and landlords to loot, 1 1 the movement may be led to 
political compromise or to increasing violence to try and seize 
more productive resources. 
The question of the political resources facing the Mao-
baadi vanguard is also crucial. Unlike the Naxalite leader-
ship, Maobaacli leaders have strong personal connections to 
Nepal's high caste elite. This may provide the vanguard with 
an incen tive to defect from the mass movement (if a mass 
movement does indeed exist in Nepal) and obtain personal 
political rewards instead. 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
My analysis of the Naxalite movements in India suggests 
several key questions to consider regarding the Maobaadi 
of Nepal: To what extent is Nepa l's movement 'new' and to 
what extent does it draw on pre-existing memories of ethni-
cally conceived struggles? Are there geographical var iations 
in the degree to which the movement is rooted or embedded 
in the locaP Second: what is the relationship of vanguard to 
mass movement7 How does it change from place to place and 
through time? Do the tactics of the Maoists resonate with local 
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prac tices or a re they perceived as ex ternal impositions, orare 
they some s ubt le combination of the two7 How do loca l popu-
lati ons pe rceive the Maois ts: as either exte rnal threat or as a 
so lution to loca l problems7 How h ave resource needs sh aped 
the re lat ionship between elite vangu a rd an d loca l mass m ove-
ments7 How m ay these rela tionships ch an ge in the future7 
The Naxalite m ovem ent shows that the a nswers to these 
questions w ill be place sp ecific and will have changed over 
time. lf the comparison tells u s anything, it is that a unita r y 
approach to the an alysis of the Maois t movement is bound to 
be unsatis factory. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 See for example the latest work on social movement theory by 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001). 
2 This is also the message that comes across from Sara Shneicler-
man's piece in this volume. 
3 l am drawing on several secondary accounts, especia lly by 
Damas (1991), Raro (1971), 1vlohanty (1977) and Ray (1988). tvlost 
of these accounts, though not Ray's, are wr illen by scholars on the 
Left who sought to explain defic iencies in the strategy of the Nax-
a lites th ough expressing sympathy with their broad aim s. India's 
Econom ic and Political \ 'Vee kly is also an important source . tvlohan 
Ram's article in the August issue of 1972 provides a useful ove rview 
of Naxa lism from the perspective of the democratic left. The Nax-
alites' own version of history can be accessed on the website of one 
of thei r fact ions: www.fas.org/ir p/world/pa ra/mcc. htm. 
4 1vlazumdar's propaganda is found in the revolutionary Indi an 
newspaper Liberation in issues between 1968 and 1970. 
5 Omveclt (1993) makes this espec iall y clear. 
6 The nihili stic 'urban terror' in Calcutta is the focus of Ray 
(1988), although he overlooks the great differences between thi s 
urban violence and the movement in the countrys ide. 
7 See Bannerjee (2002) 
8 Chant lvlazumclar quoted in Bannerjee (2002) p 147 
9 Reddy strongly opposed the annihilation line but at this point 
Mazumclar had effectively 'hijacked ' the movement and flooded the 
var ious local movements with his Bengali allies. 
10 l am drawing here on a large number of recent newspaper ar-
ticles obtained on the internet, which are too numerous to list. A 
Google sea rch under some of the themes di scussed above will revea l 
a lot of material. The Maoist Command Cente r's ow n web site now 
openly uses the language of ' identity politics' alongside the more 
traditional Maoist rhetoric. 
11 Maoists in Nepal also rely on donations from businesses in 
Kathmandu , but it seems doubtful that this is as sustain able a form 
of funding as the ownership of productive land . 
12 The current ceasefire process of Spring 2003 is a tes ting ground 
for thi s proposition. 
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